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ABSTRACT 
Commodity agricultural production in tropical forest regions is expanding rapidly and is 
frequently linked to deforestation, increased emissions of greenhouse gases, biodiversity loss, 
poor working conditions and wages, and land tenure conflicts. Voluntary certification programs 
are one type of intervention used to incentivize the agricultural commodity sector to improve 
sustainability, by incentivizing supply-chain actors to produce and source products according to 
agreed standards. We used field interviews to consider how the additionality of these programs 
might be maximized. We identify two dimensions of additionality: 1) increased participation by 
producers and 2) greater rigor of sustainability standards. We use the cases of the Roundtable on 
Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) voluntary certification program, with a focus on Indonesia, and the 
Sustainable Agriculture Network (SAN) voluntary certification program for cattle, with a focus 
on Brazil to examine the role of program design choices in influencing sustainability outcomes. 
Design choices include standards setting, adoption, implementation, and monitoring and 
enforcement. We find that design choices by certification program developers tend to strengthen 
one of the two dimensions of additionality, increased participation or increased rigor, at the 
expense of the other. We recommend that design choices should aim to increase the value of 
participation for producers without sacrificing the rigor of the standard, for example by setting 
intermediary milestones for program participants without compromising the ultimate ambition of 
meaningfully enhanced sustainability. 
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TABLE AND FIGURE CAPTIONS 
Table 1. Interviewees in Brazil and Indonesia. 
Table 2: Categories of stakeholder interview questions 
Figure 1. Additionality and the challenges for producers in complying with the Principles and 
Criteria of voluntary certification programs. 
Figure 2. Location of field research sites and interviews conducted in (a) Indonesia and (b) 
Brazil (adapted from Alves-Pinto et al. 2013). 
Figure 3. The logic and progression of voluntary certification programs. a) Setting standards; b) 
Some producers who were already meeting the level of sustainability identified by the standards 
become certified; c) Inclusion of design choices (e.g. governance structure) create additional 
benefits that incentivize other producers to become certified. 
Figure 4. Sustainability “transactions” between producers who must implement best practices 
and external stakeholders who demand incorporation of best practices into production processes. 
In a market-based scenario (a), there are a number of inefficiencies inherent to the transaction, 
while for transactions in which the voluntary certification program functions as a broker (b) the 
exchange of monetary and non-monetary value is measured against a common reference (the 
standards) and with verification that the producer is in compliance with those standards. 
Figure 5. a) Producer maturation trajectory where an intermediate stage exists between capacity 
building (assistance) and participation in the context of achieving certification standards (RSPO-
style program) b) Producer maturation trajectory where a producer moves from capacity building 
directly to participation and contribution in the context of achieving certification standards 
(SAN-style program).  
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ACRONYMS 
AMDAL Analisis Mengenai Dampak Lingkungan Hidup (Environmental Impact 
Statement) 
CB Certifying Body 
CSPO   Certified Sustainable Palm Oil 
FPIC  Free, Prior and Informed Consent 
HCV  High Conservation Value 
ISC  International Standards Committee 
ISPO   Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil 
P&C   Principles and Criteria 
RSPO   Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil 
SAN   Sustainable Agriculture Network 
WWF   World Wildlife Fund 
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1.  INTRODUCTION  
This paper explores how decisions in the design of voluntary certification programs have 
the potential to help scale-up those programs and increase their contribution to enhanced 
sustainability. We contrast two different programs, the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil 
(RSPO) certification program (with a focus on Indonesia) and the Sustainable Agriculture 
Network (SAN) certification program for cattle (with a focus on Brazil). The two cases provide 
examples of how program designers seek to maximize non-monetary values to producers and 
other stakeholders, and how attempts by programs to broker non-monetary values between the 
two groups have the potential to benefit all stakeholders by maintaining the rigor of the program. 
Oil palm cultivation and cattle ranching are closely associated with tropical deforestation 
and other adverse environmental outcomes (Bustamante et al., 2012; Wakker et al., 2004; 
Wilcove & Koh, 2010). Indonesia is the leading producer of oil palm and Brazil has the largest 
commercial herd of beef cattle (Bustamante et al., 2012; USDA, 2010). From 1990-2005, more 
than 50% of oil palm expansion in Indonesia resulted in deforestation (Koh & Wilcove, 2008). 
Similarly, Brazil slaughters over 200 million heads of cattle each year (FAO Stat, 2013), and is 
the largest exporter of cattle products globally. Brazil’s cattle industry may be responsible for up 
to 70% of deforestation that occurs within the country each year (Bustamante et al., 2012). 
Voluntary certification programs are one type of market governance intervention that has 
emerged in commodity sectors with ‘forest risk’ (Auld et al., 2008; Bass et al., 2001; Klooster, 
2005; Steering Committee, 2012). These programs are a leading driver of an emerging 
alternative market for commodity products sourced according to commitments by individual 
actors and organizations to greater environmental and social sustainability (Smith & Maser, 
2010; Taylor, 2005). Voluntary certification programs set minimum acceptable criteria for 
agricultural practices, including growing and distributing commodity products, with the 
expectation that improved practices will result in sustainability outcomes (Klooster, 2005). Most 
of the best management practices prescribed by the voluntary certification program standards 
target the production stage (Bitzer et al., 2008), since this is where the majority of threats to 
sustainability, including deforestation, occur (Cashore, 2004; Gulbrandsen, 2005; Overdevest, 
2004). The programs offer incentives such as price premiums, risk management, brand 
protection, and access to finance and new markets to supply-chain actors who agree to adopt 
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these sustainability standards into their production processes (Cashore et al., 2003; Fulponi, 
2006; Overdevest & Rickenbach, 2006; Prakash & Potoski, 2012; Rickenbach & Overdevest, 
2006; van Kooten, 2005). In turn, civil society groups use compliance with voluntary 
certification programs to track the behavior of supply-chain actors. Consumers who wish to 
make more informed purchase decisions also rely on voluntary certification programs to verify 
the sustainability of retail products (Tallontire, 2007). 
The recruitment of producers to participate in voluntary certification programs is critical 
to the scaling up of such programs and to the achievement of greater sustainability in the sector. 
Typically, large progressive producers are the first to be targeted and to join these programs 
because they already integrate many best practices into their production processes, independently 
of their commitment to do so under certification (Bernstein & Cashore, 2007; Cashore, 2004). 
By recruiting first from this class of large producers, programs come closer to achieving scale, 
but may have limited additionality in terms of moving sustainability beyond baseline conditions. 
In contrast, small and medium-sized producers, who tend to have the most to improve in terms of 
increased sustainability, are challenged by the overall rigor of a program’s standards by limited 
capacity and resources to make changes in production practices (Fig. 1). Together, the scale of 
participation and the rigor of the standards dictate the aggregate additionality of the program, and 
its potential to move the sector beyond baseline conditions of environmental and social 
sustainability. 
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NB: Producers are hypothetical, and do not represent actual data points.  
Figure 1. Additionality and the challenges for producers in complying with the Principles and 
Criteria of voluntary certification programs. 
 
The availability of a price premium for the production of certified sustainable agricultural 
products is one predictor of whether a voluntary certification program will attract a large and 
diverse pool of participants (i.e. achieve scale) while maintaining the rigor of its standards (Eden, 
2009; Henson & Reardon, 2005; Klooster, 2010). Less attention has been paid to the means by 
which voluntary certification programs generate non-monetary forms of value for participants, 
but this is also an important mechanism to entice participants (Overdevest & Rickenbach, 2006). 
Non-monetary benefits include access to finance and markets as well as risk management and 
brand protection (Tallontire, 2007; van Kooten et al., 2005). This paper asks how the 
administrators of voluntary certification programs can broker the exchange of non-monetary 
value between producers on the one hand and sustainability stakeholders on the other. Since 
programs seek to recruit additional participants without compromising the rigor of their 
standards, we review the other core activities of voluntary certification programs (besides 
standards-setting) and the structure of the program itself as potential sources of non-monetary 
value generally and enticements to producers in particular. 
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2. METHODS 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted in Indonesia and Brazil with 54 key 
stakeholders in the palm oil and cattle supply chains, respectively. Interviews were conducted 
with actors from the state sector, civil society (local and international NGOs), and market sector 
(producers, processors, and retailers) (Table 1). Questions addressed the interviewees’ 
perceptions of voluntary certification; financial and logistical issues related to adoption and 
implementation; the role of non-supply chain stakeholders and their influence on producers; the 
market for certified sustainable versions of the commodity product; and opinions about the 
design and structure of the program (Table 2). Interviews were conducted over a six-week period 
in each country (Indonesia: June-July 2013; Brazil: July-August 2013). Thirty individuals and 
stakeholder organizations were interviewed in Indonesia by CN, HK, PW, and SD, in the 
provinces of Jakarta (in the cities of Jakarta and Bogor), Riau (Kuantan Singingi and Pelalawan 
regencies) and West Kalimantan (Pontianak and Sangau regencies) and 24 individuals and 
stakeholder organizations were interviewed in Brazil by BC, HNAP, MO, and PN) in the states 
of São Paulo (in the cities of Piracicaba and São Paulo) and Mato Grosso (Cuiaba, Tangara da 
Serra, Alta Floresta, and Sinop) (Fig. 2; Table 1). In Indonesia, site visits were made to two 
RSPO-certified oil palm plantations in Sumatra and to both certified and non-certified 
smallholders in West Kalimantan (Fig. 2a). In Brazil, site visits were made to one SAN-certified 
farm (Fazenda São Marcelo) and two non-certified farms in Mato Grosso (Fig. 2b). In Indonesia, 
interviews were conducted in either English or Bahasa Indonesian. In Brazil, most interviews 
were conducted in Brazilian Portuguese. 
Table 1. Interviewees in Brazil and Indonesia 
Interviewee role in the 
organization 
Organization Organization sector Country of 
interview 
Researcher/Director of 
Agribusiness at Surya University 
Indonesian Center for Agriculture 
Socio Economic and Policy Studies, 
Ministry of Agriculture 
University Indonesia 
Researcher Bogor Agricultural University (IPB) University Indonesia 
Deputy Director - Market 
Transformation 
WWF NGO Indonesia 
Global Coordinator for Palm Oil,  
Palm oil campaigner for 
Greenpeace Southeast Asia 
GreenPeace NGO Indonesia 
Palm Oil Project Manager Zoological Society of London 
(ZSL) 
NGO Indonesia 
 Sawit Watch NGO Indonesia 
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Project Officer Forest Peoples Programme (FPP) NGO Indonesia 
Senior Policy Advisor Forest Peoples Programme (FPP) NGO Indonesia 
Officer AMAN NGO Indonesia 
 LBBT NGO Indonesia 
 YPSBK NGO Indonesia 
Head of Campaign and 
Advocacy Department 
WALHI NGO Indonesia 
National Coordinator Serikat Petani Kelapa Sawit 
(SPKS/Palm Oil Farmer's Union) 
Association Indonesia 
Indonesia Director RSPO Roundtable Indonesia 
 Indonesia Palm Oil Association 
(GAPKI) 
Industry Organization Indonesia 
Consultant Daemeter Consulting Consulting Indonesia 
HCV Consultant Tropenbos Consulting  Indonesia 
 Sucofindo Certification Body Indonesia 
RSPO Scheme Manager for 
ASEAN 
British Standards Institute Group 
(BSI) 
Certification Body Indonesia 
 PT Sai Certification Body Indonesia 
PR, R&D, General Manager, 
Technical Manager 
Anonymous Producer/MNC Indonesia 
Deputy Head, Sugar Cane 
Division 
Anonymous Producer/MNC Indonesia 
Chief Operating Officer, 
Vice President, Corp Affairs 
Anonymous Producer/MNC Indonesia 
Local funding manager Anonymous Producer Indonesia 
Owner, Sustainability manager Anonymous Producer Indonesia 
Plant manager Anonymous Producer Indonesia 
Head of Environment, Health & 
Safety 
Anonymous Producer Indonesia 
Independent smallholder Anonymous Producer/non-
certified/smallholder 
Indonesia 
- Anonymous Producer/non-certified/ 
mid-sized 
Indonesia 
- Anonymous Producer/non-certified Indonesia 
Global Product Specialist - 
Environmental, Social & Trade 
Standards  
Sustainable Business Advisory 
Department  
International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) 
Banking Indonesia 
Agricultural Certification Imaflora NGO/SAN certifier Brazil 
Executive Director Imaflora NGO/SAN certifier Brazil 
Agricultural Certification Imaflora NGO/SAN certifier Brazil 
Cattle and Agriculture Political-
Economics Analist 
ICV NGO Brazil 
Executive Coordinator ICV NGO Brazil 
Project Manager ICV NGO Brazil 
Sustainable Municipality 
Coordinator 
ICV NGO Brazil 
Sustainable cattle analyst ICV NGO Brazil 
Researcher Amigos da Terra NGO Brazil 
Conservation Program Analyst WWF NGO Brazil 
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Sustainable Harvests Coordinator The Nature Conservancy NGO Brazil 
Technical Manager Fazendas São Marcelo Producer Brazil 
Manager Fazendas São Marcelo Producer Brazil 
Human Resources Analyst Fazendas São Marcelo Producer Brazil 
Producer - Producer Brazil 
Producer - Producer Brazil 
Producer Fazenda Salto das Nuvens Producer Brazil 
Producer and President of the 
Sindicate 
Sindicado dos prodtores de Alta 
Floresta 
Producer Brazil 
President of Animal Proteine 
sector 
AC Agromercantil Producer Brazil 
Sustainability sector Marfrig Slaughterhouse Brazil 
Quality Guarantee Margrig Slaughterhouse Brazil 
Marfrig Club Marfrig Slaughterhouse Brazil 
Marfrig Club Marfrig Slaughterhouse Brazil 
Supervisor of Sustainability Marfrig Slaughterhouse Brazil 
Sustainability Director JBS Slaughterhouse Brazil 
Manager Carrefour Varejo Brazil 
Sustainability Director Walmart Varejo Brazil 
Sustainability Manager Walmart Varejo Brazil 
Latin America Protein Director McDonalds Restaurant Brazil 
Executive Director Beef Exporters Association - 
ABIEC 
Association Brazil 
Techinical Assistant Beef Exporters Association - 
ABIEC 
Association Brazil 
Marketing Specialist Range and 
Pastures 
Dow Industry Brazil 
Institutional Relations Dow Industry Brazil 
Executive Coordinator GTPS Roundtable Brazil 
Director Acrimat Producer Association Brazil 
Post-Doctoral and FSC auditor FEA/Imaflora Researcher/Auditor Brazil 
Environmental Analist IBAMA Government Brazil 
Researcher Embrapa Government Brazil 
 Secma 1 Government Brazil 
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Table 2: Categories of Stakeholder Interview Questions 
 
 
Background of interviewee and organization 
Perception about the certification program 
•Motivations and challenges 
•Influence of the organization on program design 
Participation in the certification program 
•Needed resources (e.g. expertise, money) 
Compliance (if applicable) 
Sustainability outcomes (if applicable) 
Rewards for participating in the program (monetary, non-monetary) 
View on prospect of the certification program 
Practices that the organization has to change 
   
   
 




Figure 2. Location of field research sites and interviews conducted in (a) Indonesia and (b) 
Brazil (adapted from Alves-Pinto et al. 2013). 
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2.1 The Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil certification program 
 Concerns about severe sustainability issues associated with palm oil gave rise to a global 
multi-stakeholder governance initiative, the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO).  The 
World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and Unilever initiated a first conference in 2003 to address these 
concerns (RSPO, 2012). This conference brought together 200 participants from 16 countries and, 
in 2004, the RSPO was officially established. The RSPO’s mission is to “transform markets to 
make sustainable palm oil the norm” (RSPO, 2012). In 2007, the RSPO certification program 
was launched, leveraging the existing governance structure and membership of the RSPO (RSPO, 
2012). The certification program establishes a set of standards—a set of eight principles and 39 
criteria (P&C)—for producing, processing, distributing, and selling sustainable palm oil. Other 
core activities of the program include verification and enforcement of participant compliance. To 
date, the RSPO certification program has certified 50 producers and accounts for 15% of palm 
oil production globally (RSPO, 2012). The RSPO certification program features four chain-of-
custody levels for certified sustainable palm oil (CSPO). Identity preserved CSPO is segregated 
and each certified unit is traceable from farm to retailer. Segregated CSPO is remains separate 
from non-certified oil, but segregated batches are blended together. Mass balance certified oil is 
blended with regular palm oil, but CSPO quantities are tracked in order to match claim volumes. 
The book and claim system has CSPO blended with non-CSPO batches. Producers receive 
certificates for the volume of CSPO they produced, and those certificates are sellable to other 
supply-chain actors in order to match claimed volumes (RSPO, 2011). 
2.2 The Sustainable Agriculture Network certification program for cattle 
The Sustainable Agriculture Network (SAN) is a coalition of independent non-profit 
conservation organizations formed in 2001 whose aim is to establish “sustainable agricultural 
standards” and promote the social and environmental sustainability of agricultural activities by 
developing high global standards and criteria for agricultural commodities such as coffee, cocoa, 
banana, fruits, chili, flowers, palm oil, and tea (Sustainable Agriculture Network, 2010). The 
SAN Sustainable Cattle Production System Standard (hereafter, SAN cattle certification 
program) was launched in 2010, following three rounds of stakeholder consultation. The SAN 
cattle certification program combines the Sustainable Agriculture Standard (10 principles and 99 
criteria, used for all SAN agricultural commodities; created in 2008) and the Sustainable Cattle 
Production System Standard (an additional 5 principles and 36 criteria, specifically relevant to 
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cattle; created in 2010) (Sustainable Agriculture Network, 2010). The goal of the SAN cattle 
certification program is to elevate the environmental and social sustainability of the cattle supply 
chain by providing supply-chain actors with a set of standards that reflect a high-level of 
sustainable practices. The standards address environmental and social responsibility including 
topics such as cattle management, pasture and soil management, animal welfare and carbon 
footprint reduction. The standards require strict, annual audits and strive for continuous 
improvement. To date, three farms and one slaughterhouse have been certified under the SAN 
cattle certification program (Sustainable Agriculture Network, 2010).    
3. RESULTS 
We categorize the design elements and functions of voluntary certification programs into 
four core activities, based on the literature. These four core activities are: standards setting, 
adoption, implementation, and monitoring and enforcement. Our categories reflect a distillation 
of the literature describing the structure and features of a wide variety of private standards and 
voluntary certification programs (see Gulbrandsen, 2005; Henson & Humphrey, 2010; Raynolds 
et al., 2007; Scarlat & Dallemand, 2011; von Geibler, 2013). The design and structure of these 
core activities provide program designers with opportunities to strike a balance between 
encouraging participation and maintaining the rigor of the standards. Responses from our 
interviews call attention to the ways in which program design choices vary across voluntary 
certification programs and how those variations have the potential to influence whether 
producers are able to gain monetary and non-monetary values from participating in the program. 
We also recognize the importance of external factors and their influence on whether producers 
decide to participate in voluntary certification programs. External factors may create 
disincentives for producers as they face additional obstacles to realizing monetary and non-
monetary values (incentives and enticements) from their participation in the program. The 
challenges that producers face in their efforts to comply with standards highlights a process of 
participant maturation that includes capacity building and a period of trial and error 
implementing better practices and meeting standards before they fully contribute to the 
additionality of a program. 
3.1 Standard setting 
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 Standard setting refers to the development of goals, protocols, and indicators for guiding 
participants toward enhanced sustainability in their practices. Standards are used to connect the 
actions of individual participants to the aggregate contributions of the voluntary certification 
program as a whole to sector-wide sustainability. 
3.1.1 Governance 
Certification programs establish rules about which actors are empowered to direct the 
agenda of the program and set standards through their governance structures. In many cases, 
program designers must consider how existing external market relationships, such as those 
between retailers and producers, influence the internal dynamics of the program. The ability of 
producers to set standards is likely to influence participation rates and the rigor of the standards. 
In turn, the governance structure of programs influences their legitimacy and the program’s 
additionality as perceived by these different stakeholders. 
The RSPO certification program is administered by the RSPO. Members of the RSPO fall 
into seven sectors of stakeholders: oil palm growers, palm oil processors or traders, consumer 
goods manufacturers, retailers, financial institutions, environmental NGOs, and social NGOs, 
though not all membership sectors are represented proportionately (RSPO, 2012). Members have 
voting rights in the General Assembly (RSPO, 2012). A subset of the members is tasked by the 
Executive Board to design the P&C and then all members can vote to approve the P&C. 
The organizational structure for the SAN certification program for cattle is similar in that 
it has members that make up a General Assembly, an executive committee, and a secretariat. 
Unlike the RSPO, the SAN is not organized as a roundtable but rather as a consortium of civil 
society organizations. The International Standards Committee (ISC) provides input into 
determination for the SAN standards, including those for the SAN cattle certification program. 
The ISC is comprised of 12 elected independent members who are international experts and 
represent various stakeholder categories: academic, NGO, producer, technical, government, and 
industry (Sustainable Agriculture Network, 2010). Local communities and indigenous groups 
have not been included in the standards setting process to date. 
The two certification programs take differing approaches to determining who can 
influence the program’s direction. Although a diverse group of stakeholders are represented in 
RSPO deliberations and decision-making, environmental and social NGOs have been critical that 
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the program standards reflect the disproportionate influence of a minority of market-sector 
stakeholder groups and are consequently not as rigorous as they ought to be. The result is RSPO 
approval of standards that are in close alignment with what industry actors believe is realistic in 
terms of cost and practicality. However, this approach limits progress towards more rigorous 
environmental and social standards, such as curbing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. In 
contrast, the SAN cattle program’s standards are more strongly influenced by a consortium of 
conservation NGOs. This has led to a standards setting process with a greater emphasis on 
meaningful environmental and social standards. As a result, the program is widely accepted by 
civil society stakeholders as rigorous, but participation has been suppressed since supply-chain 
actors believe that the SAN cattle program does not reflect realistic capabilities, interests, and 
priorities of many supply chain players, particularly small and medium-sized producers. 
3.1.2 Sustainability standards 
The P&C contain the details of a voluntary certification program’s standards, and are 
based on an overall set of goals for what the program is designed to accomplish in terms of 
influencing sustainability in the sector. In general, producers favor standards that are less 
rigorous. Large producers have complex, expansive operations that become more difficult to 
certify if the standards are very rigorous, while small producers tend to lack the resources, 
capacity, and know-how to implement very rigorous standards. Meanwhile, standards that are 
perceived as weak lack the support of civil society groups and consumers, calling into question 
the value of participating in the certification program for would-be participants. Therefore, the 
P&C reflect a careful balance or trade-off between setting requirements at a level of resource 
commitment that maintains a positive return on investment while raising standards to a level 
considered credible by external evaluators. 
Palm oil producers must follow eight P&C that address social, environmental, and 
economic sustainability concerns in order to achieve RSPO certification for each plantation. 
Producers also must commit to transparency and be in compliance with applicable local and 
national laws and regulations. Social sustainability commitments include requirements to 
compensate local communities when companies acquire their land for development. The 
principle of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) governs such interactions between 
producers and local communities and indigenous groups. Environmental sustainability 
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commitments include requirements to adopt better practices to maintain soil quality, erosion 
control, surface and ground water, and pest management. Producers are expected to mitigate 
negative impacts on biodiversity by protecting lands identified as High Conservation Value 
(HCV), in part by completing an environmental impact statement (an AMDAL, in Indonesia). 
The P&C also require producers to improve energy efficiency, use renewable energy, and reduce 
pollution, including the emission of greenhouse gases. To ensure long-term financial 
sustainability, producers must develop a business plan with a minimum three-year outlook. Each 
criterion identifies indicators, 45% of which are defined as compulsory. Failure to comply with 
compulsory indicators results in major nonconformities, which prohibit the issuance of a 
certificate (RSPO, 2007). In cases where a producer owns or operates many plantations or 
subsidiary companies, a single plantation or subsidiary can be certified as having met the P&C, 
as verified by an auditor, even if other plantations have not yet met the standard. Subsidiary 
companies thus frequently achieve certification at different times, depending on how close they 
are to the standards (RSPO, 2013). 
The standards of the SAN cattle certification program address a wide range of sustainable 
farm management issues such as the environmental management system, wildlife protection, 
animal welfare, ecosystem and water conservation, occupational health and safety, soil, waste, 
range, and pasture management, and fair treatment of workers. In Brazil, the SAN cattle 
certification program is more stringent in most categories than national laws. For example, the 
program requires producers goes beyond the national Forest Code (law no. 4.771) that governs 
deforestation forest conservation. Additional SAN standards include the Chain Of Custody 
Standard, Group Certification Standard and the Climate Module, to certify non-producer actors 
such as slaughterhouses, to encourage community or co-op based certification and empower 
smallholder farmers, and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, respectively (Sustainable 
Agriculture Network, 2011).  To become certified, a farm must comply with at least 50% of the 
criteria of each principle and 80% of the total criteria. Only when all producers and processors 
throughout the chain are certified are they authorized to use the Rainforest Alliance Certified™ 
seal on their products. 
The P&C of the two certification programs reflect different levels of feasibility to 
producers. The P&C of the RSPO certification are developed with the input of all members of 
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the roundtable. This leads to standards that are more widely accepted by producers, but that are 
often challenged by social and environmental NGOs who do not believe there are enough 
changes to bring about additionality. On the other hand, the P&C of the SAN certification 
program for cattle are rigorous and would likely change the practices of producers towards 
greater sustainability, but are perceived by producers as difficult to achieve. 
3.2 Adoption  
 The adoption of a program by producers is critical to the program’s success. Program 
administrators make conscious decisions about which types of participant to target and engage 
with and when, with respect to the rollout of the program. For instance, the achievement of 
certification by producers who were previously further from meeting the standards, such as 
small- and medium scale producers, generates more additionality. But the journey of such a 
producer towards compliance is often complex and involves financial constraints, as certification 
can be expensive. The recruitment efforts of program designers must align with the range of 
potential motivations held by producers who expect financial or strategic advantages from their 
participation. 
The choices of program designers about which prospective participants to target affect 
the rate at which programs achieve scale and the types of sustainability standards they are able to 
implement. Recruitment strategies vary for different participant classes and over time as the 
program’s mission evolves and responds to changing external dynamics in the broader market. 
Large producers are targeted early in recruitment efforts because their production processes are 
often already aligned closely with the best management practices required by certification 
programs (Bernstein & Cashore, 2007; Cashore, 2004; Taylor, 2005; Fig. 3). Large producers 
also have the financial resources to implement new practices. Meanwhile, securing the 
participation of small producers has the advantage of elevating the sustainability of a producer 
class that has more room for improvement, resulting in greater additionality of sustainability 
above baseline conditions compared to when large, progressive producers participate. Also, 
increasing the diversity of participant types to include more small- and mid-size participants 
minimizes the risk that a program’s agenda is undermined by the priorities or exit of a few large 
participants (Taylor, 2005). 
 
   
   
 










          
 
Figure 3. The logic and progression of voluntary certification programs. a) Setting standards; b) 
Some producers who were already meeting the level of sustainability identified by the standards 
become certified; c) Inclusion of design choices (e.g. governance structure) create additional 
benefits that incentivize other producers to become certified. 
There are other multiple compelling reasons that motivate participation in certification 
programs, in addition to monetary incentives. For example, programs offer a total management 
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system for operating profitable and efficient plantations. Alternatively, companies operating 
internationally may use certification to standardize and coordinate complex, geographically 
diverse operations. More progressive producers embrace certification because it aligns with their 
existing core sustainability values that may not otherwise have been recognized by external 
stakeholders. Achieving certification also helps to highlight “sustainability hotspots”, or areas of 
concern within the industry so that producers can efficiently expend the resources they commit to 
sustainability. Finally, potential members are attracted to the program because it creates 
opportunities to access export markets, such as in the United States and Europe, and because the 
program’s best practices are increasingly demanded by financing institutions as a precondition 
for lending. 
 The SAN certification program for cattle initially strategically targeted cattle farms and 
slaughterhouses with existing commitments to sustainability. The Brazilian NGO partner of the 
SAN, Imaflora, reached out early in the development of the program to Fazendas São Marcelo, 
one of the most socially and environmentally progressive farms in Brazil. Fazendas São Marcelo 
joined the program because the management and sustainability practices enabled them to reduce 
their operating cost and business risks, and the certification could yield a slightly higher sale 
price for their product. Moreover, the owner of Fazendas São Marcelo was known as being very 
progressive and thus saw certification as a strategy for getting ahead in the market. Prior to 
achieving the SAN certification, Fazendas São Marcelo had previously been certified for organic 
production, and had adopted a corporate policy committed to no deforestation; both factors were 
helpful to the company as it sought SAN certification. For the certified slaughterhouse Marfrig, 
the cost and infrastructure needed to become SAN certified was relatively low, and SAN cattle 
certification positioned the company to enter premium beef markets, both domestically and 
internationally. Imaflora continues to pursue other large farms as participants in the SAN cattle 
certification program, but progress is slow ‒ in part because producers are unwilling to expend 
resources to achieve the program’s rigorous requirements without a strong signal of consumer 
demand for certified sustainable beef products. 
 If large producers already have best practices in place prior to certification, their costs of 
meeting certification requirements are relatively low. In both the RSPO and SAN case, 
motivation is greatest for large producers who have the resources to adopt a comprehensive 
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sustainability management strategy and whose activities are also the most visible to civil society 
groups. Large producers are better able to overcome technical barriers to implementation 
because of the additional financial resources they can commit to the certification process. 
Meanwhile, capacity constraints prevent producers for whom the value-added of certification is 
highest from adopting sustainability standards (Fig. 3). 
3.3 Implementation 
 The bright-line for achieving certification varies depending on the rigor of the P&C and 
the rules of the program pertaining to implementation of the standard. Some programs require 
full implementation, including all farms or entities owned by the parent company, before a 
certificate is awarded. This requirement increases the amount of time necessary to reach full 
compliance, relative to programs that recognize each entity as they become certified and then 
confer full certification after all subsidiaries have been certified. Implementation requirements 
and the time-scale for producers to achieve certification are likely to affect program participation 
rates. 
Voluntary certification programs take different approaches to awarding certification to 
their participants. The RSPO certification program features a (quasi-official) progression, with 
membership status in the roundtable acting as an intermediate milestone before actors achieve 
full certification. Membership status confers many of the privileges of full certification, 
including affiliation with the program and participation (e.g. voting rights) in the governance and 
administration of the program. The SAN cattle certification program awards certification after 
the rancher has fulfilled a minimum requirement of P&C for every unit of production under its 
management (Sustainable Agriculture Network, 2010). It is easier to distinguish sustainable from 
non-sustainable products in programs with no intermediate horizons, but such programs also 
delay the moment at which producers can redeem value from their efforts. Delaying the 
redemption of value may have negative consequences for the participation of producers who 
would be motivated by near term benefits. 
Oil palm producers can become members of the RSPO roundtable before any of their 
plantations become fully certified. Producers who become members have to set time-bound plans 
to be certified by an RSPO-approved third-party certification body (CB) (RSPO, 2012). The 
time-bound plan is a pledge that demonstrates a producer’s intention to certify all of its 
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plantations before a specified year. Even if the majority of the subsidiaries are able to achieve 
certification with relative ease, one or two with outstanding land conflicts or particularly 
problematic environmental practices can delay the entire certification process. In such cases, the 
parent company must revise its time-bound plan, and the CB must approve all changes. This 
approach can benefit participants since members can, for example, vote on P&C revisions before 
they achieve full certification. 
The SAN cattle program requires full certification before the Rainforest Alliance 
Certified™ seal can be placed on any product, and SAN does not have a governance entity 
analogue to the RSPO roundtable within which producers can participate. In addition to an 
individual certification, group certification is also available. Group certification enables a 
number of farms (whether under the same owner or same community) to seek certification 
collectively. Group certification thus lowers the cost per production unit, but also poses risks to 
the group since if one entity is not compliant, all entities will be considered non-compliant. The 
JD group, which operates Fazendas São Marcelo and other farms, has received group 
certification. 
While the RSPO certification program allows individual subsidiaries to be certified as a 
producer works to gain certification for all of its subsidiaries, the SAN certification program for 
cattle does not have this provision. This restriction can lessen willingness of new producers to 
join the SAN cattle certification program, while leading conservation NGOs to question the 
RSPO program’s credibility, because participants can achieve certification before all of their 
units of production are in compliance with standards.  
3.4 Monitoring and Enforcement 
 Certification programs are able to successfully translate goals into outcomes by 
developing auditing procedures to track participant progress towards the fulfillment of their 
sustainability commitments. Conformity assessment also provides data on whether producers are 
faithfully executing the principles behind the standards. This is critical to the success of 
programs achieving additionality in the sector. 
The auditing procedures for both case-study programs are similar, in that they include 
third party assessors. The governing body accredits these independent assessors and only 
accredited CBs can conduct audits. Maintaining assessor independence lends credibility to the 
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programs, although it can also lead to challenges in standardizing the implementation of the P&C. 
The credibility of audits is central to the legitimacy and credibility of certification programs. 
However, while strict, quantifiable assessment methods, using templates and checklists, provide 
accurate and precise information about participant efforts, they also create opportunities for 
producers to limit their fulfillment of standards to pro forma treatments of the P&C. This can be 
problematic, for instance, when dealing with local communities, when a more in-depth and 
considered engagement is more appropriate.  
 Enforcement is fundamental to the success of voluntary certification programs because it 
distinguishes sustainable products from their non-sustainable counterparts. Voluntary 
certification programs ’re-qualify’ the value of products based on the sustainability of production 
processes, as opposed to differences in their innate qualities, such as taste, size, or hardiness 
(Buller & Morris, 2004), but sustainability practices do not register very obviously in the end 
product. Consumer confidence in the declared sustainability of a producer or product is thus 
dependent on verification mechanisms to ensure strict compliance (Guthman, 2007). 
In the RSPO certification scheme, CBs are responsible for enforcement. They assess 
whether or not participants are compliant, then report their findings and any major 
nonconformities to the roundtable. The RSPO’s complaint system is available to both internal 
and external stakeholders, to report participant nonconformities (RSPO, 2012). Failure to address 
minor nonconformities can result in the RSPO elevating the issue to a major nonconformity, and 
if not resolved in a timely manner may lead to suspension and permit revocation (RSPO, 2007). 
However, civil society groups have criticized the RSPO’s enforcement mechanism for a lack of 
transparency, delays in initiating investigations, and weak consequences for noncompliant 
participants (Greenpeace, 2013). Rather than restrict themselves to the RSPO system, however, 
many of these groups have chosen to pursue redress in other forms, such as consumer awareness 
campaigns, boycotts, and direct engagement with producers. 
In the SAN cattle certification program, independent CBs track the sustainability 
performance of producers via a cycle of one full audit followed by two annual less-exhaustive 
audits. After three years, the producer must undergo a full audit again. The CBs encourage 
producers to strive for continuous improvement with respect to the number of criteria achieved. 
Each country’s CB either conducts the audit itself or contracts with an authorized third party to 
   
   
 
University of Michigan | School of Natural Resources and Environment  
27 
complete the audit. The CB does not provide recommendations or technical assistance about the 
changes needed for producers to meet the criteria, but can clarify the criteria and whether they 
have been met. 
The main challenge related to enforcement is that strict rulings often are at odds with the 
interest of the program to achieve scale by maintaining and expanding the pool of participants. 
Programs are loath to revoke certification at the risk of diminishing an already limited or fragile 
participant buy-in, but must also maintain their commitments to enforcement to the extent 
necessary in order to satisfy external stakeholders as to their credibility. 
3.5 Interaction with external factors 
Voluntary certification programs are not implemented in a vacuum: their implementation 
and the potential outcomes are invariably interacting with external factors such as other local- 
and national-level interventions (Alves-Pinto et al., 2013). External factors affect participation 
and the additionality of the program, but are beyond the direct influence of certification program 
design. External interventions may be based on combinations of policies, incentives, and 
information (Newton et al., 2013). Institutions and policies include the tools utilized by 
governments to govern land use, such as Indonesia’s moratorium on deforestation (Wich et al., 
2011) and Brazil’s Forest Code (Tollefson, 2012). Incentives include competing standards, 
which may divide the attention of participants and may confuse consumers. While these external 
interventions are outside the control of a specific program, design choices can help to manage 
their relationship to external factors. 
A key feature of voluntary certification programs are their ability to span political 
jurisdictions and to shape production practices around common best practices, as opposed to 
varying political circumstances. Most certification programs, including both the RSPO 
certification program and the SAN cattle certification program, stipulate compliance with all 
national laws as a minimum criterion for participation. Whether the standards of a certification 
program conflict with national laws or are difficult to operationalize within the institutional 
context of the producing nation has a strong influence on participation and affects whether 
producers are able to implement standards as they were intended. 
A national interpretation and reconciliation process exists in the RSPO certification 
program, to smooth potential conflicts between national laws and the standards. The national 
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interpretation states which indicators should be used by companies and CBs as baselines for 
compliance with the P&C. However, the interpretation is far from comprehensive, and this has 
resulted in a number of stakeholders in Indonesia’s palm oil industry believing that the RSPO is 
incompatible with national law and the country’s governmental structures. Principle 2 of the 
RSPO program’s P&C instruct companies to comply with the national law when it is in direct 
conflict with a P&C, but there is a concern that bending to national laws undermines the ability 
of a certification programs to standardize behavior across political jurisdictions (RSPO, 2008). 
For example, it is the expectation of the Indonesian government that land designated for 
agricultural production is used as such, and Indonesian law permits the government to reclaim 
land designated for production but that is lying fallow; this directly conflicts with the RSPO 
certification program’s requirement to protect HCV forest within agricultural areas. Producers 
consequently fear that establishing HCV set-asides will lead to revocation of their permits by the 
Indonesian government. While the RSPO secretariat and a working group seek resolution to this 
conflict, there is a seeming incompatibility between Indonesian law and the standards of the 
voluntary certification program. However, civil society groups have questioned the actual degree 
of conflict between the HCV model and Indonesian law, arguing that producers have established 
a false dichotomy in order to avoid honoring the results of a HCV assessment. While recognizing 
that there are in fact limitations to setting aside HCV land due to government land use policies, 
these groups maintain that incorporating HCV protections and other conservation efforts within 
existing estates is possible. 
Another potential conflict with national laws in Indonesia is the interaction of the RSPO 
certification program with a new government mandated scheme, the Indonesian Sustainable 
Palm Oil (ISPO) standard. ISPO is a national legal intervention that was implemented in 2011 
and is a requirement for all palm oil growers (Gillespie & Harjanthi, 2012). The Indonesian 
government has stated that all Indonesian plantations will need to be ISPO certified by 2014 
(Gillespie & Harjanthi, 2012). Many NGOs are concerned that the ISPO will compete with the 
RSPO and gain validation in the eyes of retailers and consumers. Producers, however, dismiss 
this concern, suggesting that the two schemes have significant overlap and are even 
complimentary. One grower stated that the benefit of ISPO was that it covered specific protocols 
in a way that the RSPO was too general to address, such as with regards to worker safety 
protocols. 
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The SAN cattle program does not have a national interpretation and reconciliation 
process to adapt the program to the national laws of individual countries. Instead, SAN explicitly 
requires that producers comply with national laws (Sustainable Agricultural Network, 2010). 
This creates two challenges. First, it is difficult for SAN to ensure that there are no conflict 
requirements between the national laws of individual countries and SAN’s P&C. Second, 
although to date there have been no conflicts with Brazilian laws, continual changes to national 
laws, such as Brazil’s Forest Code, creates potential uncertainties for producers. The Forest Code 
requires a set percentage (e.g. 80% in Amazonia; 50% in the cerrado biome) of each rural 
property to remain forested, and recent revisions of the Forest Code mean that producers may 
have to change their practices to conform. Some producers have elected not to engage in the 
SAN cattle certification program at least until these uncertainties are resolved. 
Other private-sector initiatives that label more sustainably produced beef products 
already exist in Brazil, and may effectively compete with the SAN cattle certification program. 
The slaughterhouse Marfrig operates the Marfrig Club program, which works with some of the 
more progressive farmers to produce export-quality beef products. And the retailer Carrefour 
operates its Garantia de Origem (GO) program. The rigor of the P&C of the SAN cattle program 
exceeds that of both of these programs, but the presence of multiple labels in the market place 
may mean that the additional benefits of certification to producers are reduced, and that 
consumers are confused by multiple similar labels. 
For both case-study programs, multiple interventions that influence the same commodity 
can have a negative impact on the certification program by undermining the integrity of the 
entire market for sustainable versions of the commodity (Taylor, 2005). Several sustainability 
schemes for the same commodity product may increase awareness, but at the expense of 
consumer confidence in any one of the programs (Muradian & Pelupessy, 2005). Voluntary 
certification programs struggle to maintain a quasi-monopoly over the sustainability niche space 
in the broader market for a commodity, as evidenced by the competition from ISPO in Indonesia 
and the presence of other label initiatives such as GO and Marfrig Club in Brazil. The result is 
that consumer income and civil society group resources may be directed to a broader range of 
sustainability interventions that each prescribe a different way for producers to achieve 
sustainability, thus diluting the accumulation of price premiums, suppressing participation, and 
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comprising the ability for any one intervention to achieve scale (Guthman, 2007; Mutersbaugh, 
2005). On the other hand, external factors, such as Brazil’s Forest Code and Indonesia’s ISPO, 
have requirements that overlap with the certification programs and lower the barriers to entry for 
potential participants (Alves-Pinto et al., 2013). 
4. DISCUSSION 
Voluntary certification programs seek to maintain the rigor of their sustainability 
standards while securing participation from commodity producers; these two factors drive the 
additionality of the program—the contributions to sustainability versus a business-as-usual 
scenario in which the program did not exist. Design choices about the core activities of voluntary 
certification programs result in trade-offs between participation and rigor of the standards are 
common in most voluntary certification programs. The prospect of a price premium is often the 
primary motivation for producers to become certified (Henson & Reardon, 2005), but premiums 
are not available in many voluntary certification programs due to a lack of wide demand for 
certified sustainable products (Klooster, 2006). Non-monetary value is also exchanged between 
producers and external stakeholders— at the most basic level, a demonstrated commitment to the 
standards of the program is exchanged for the approval of civil society groups and consumers, 
which in turn secures such benefits as market access and risk protection. In this context, 
voluntary certification programs act as a broker of monetary and non-monetary value between 
the two groups (Fig. 4), with the design choices about the core activities of the program setting 









   
   
 






Figure 4. Sustainability “transactions” between producers who must implement best practices 
and external stakeholders who demand incorporation of best practices into production processes. 
In a market-based scenario (a), there are a number of inefficiencies inherent to the transaction, 
while for transactions in which the voluntary certification program functions as a broker (b) the 
exchange of monetary and non-monetary value is measured against a common reference (the 
standards) and with verification that the producer is in compliance with those standards. 
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The activities of program as well as the way they are structured may also generate value 
for producers. For instance, the RSPO certification program has created an intermediate stage in 
the form of membership that allows producers to participate in the program before they are fully 
certified. This means that benefits to producers begin to accrue at an earlier stage as they are 
recognized for their commitments prior to full compliance. In the case of the SAN cattle 
certification program, producers are asked to fully comply with the rigorous standards before 
certification is awarded. While design choices in relation to the core activities are meant to 
increase additionality, program developers rarely consider the two facets of additionality in 
tandem. That the trade-off between increased rates of participation and increased rigor of the 
standards is a product of deliberate design choices not explicitly acknowledged by most 
stakeholders. Meaningful gains in additionality for these programs are most likely to result when 
these two facets of additionality are considered in conjunction with one another so that there is 
an increase in value to producers that accompanies increases in the rigor of standards. At the core 
of this complex dynamic between boosting participation (achieving scale) and credibility (rigor 
of standards) are issues of how certification programs understand, create (or fail to create), and 
appraise the value of participant efforts. 
4.1 A value framework for design 
 Sustainability practices increase the value of commodity products, but that extra value is 
not clearly visible to consumers. The verification components of voluntary certification 
(conformity assessment and enforcement) are therefore critical in distinguishing sustainable from 
non-sustainable producers and their products (Buller & Morris, 2004; Prakash & Potoski, 2012). 
At minimum, certification programs assign value only to efforts that fulfill standards 
requirements. The assumption is that the P&C reflect objective standards that are backed either 
by rigorous research or the consensus of stakeholders about how producers and other supply-
chain actors ought to achieve sustainability. The value is intrinsic to the best practices that 
participants implement. This set of assumptions is reflected in the structure and design choices of 
the SAN cattle certification where certification is only awarded once the producer meets the 
standards requirements. By awarding certification to compliant producers, the program facilitates 
the ability of external stakeholders to differentiate sustainable versions of commodity products 
and converts abstract sustainability value latent in best practices into other, more liquid forms of 
value. 
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The value that producers receive from voluntary certification programs certifying 
(verifying) their commitments to sustainability comes only after the standards of the program are 
fulfilled. Meeting the standards is often a lengthy and complex process that requires significant 
capital outlay before any return on investment is received by producers. The risks and 
uncertainties inherent in the outlay of capital for best management practices can discourage 
producer participation. Certification programs may confront this risk by surpassing the limited 
role of converting value from one form to another; indeed, programs may actively participate in 
the creation of value. Specifically, certification programs such as the RSPO certification program 
use their verification and enforcement mechanisms to break the value of full certification into 
smaller pieces and to create value for producers from the process of becoming certified itself. 
Verification can expand the range of value-added to include not only efforts that lead directly to 
the achievement of the sustainability goals of the program, but also to intermediate stages of 
progress, such as monitoring and training as well as other forms of progress related to capacity 
building and the commitment of the producer’s resources towards fulfilling the standards. In 
breaking down and awarding value at intermediate stages, programs can create value and more 
incentives for producers to join, especially in the absence of a price premium. 
4.1.1 Exchanges of non-monetary value  
Producers want to convert the value of their participation into economic value that 
improves their bottom line.  Voluntary certification programs such as the SAN cattle certification 
program set and verify fulfillment of standards on the assumption that there is an interest among 
stakeholders for certified sustainable commodity products. By achieving certification, producers 
who participate in voluntary certification programs that are more minimally structured, may 
expect to receive a range of non-monetary values in addition to a price premium. Forms of non-
monetary value for producer participation can include a full-fledged sustainability management 
system, opportunities for product marketing, access to finance, risk management, and the use of 
an eco-label to distinguish their products from non-sustainable counterparts (Overdevest & 
Rickenbach, 2006; Tallontire, 2007; van Kooten et al., 2005). Indeed, programs can attract 
producers who are seeking brand protection and new methods of intensifying their operations to 
increase yields. 
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Voluntary certification programs may also choose to involve producers in a broader range 
of activities beyond accomplishing the best practices that meet the sustainability standards of the 
program. Administrators of voluntary certification programs have opportunities to design and 
structure those activities in a way that will entice producers to participate in the program. The 
RSPO certification program draws heavily on the roundtable, using its membership to divide the 
value of certification into smaller pieces that provide near-term benefits to participants. 
Membership in the roundtable is considered a gateway to certification. It gives participants a 
voice in governance and other deliberations, and many external stakeholders recognize 
membership as akin, or at least related generally to certification, albeit, inaccurately. The RSPO 
certification program also permits companies to become certified even while some of their 
estates and mills are still awaiting official recognition from the CB. In these cases, companies are 
required to develop and seek approval for a time-bound plan to achieve full certification of all 
their operations. The intermediate opportunities to capture value from best practices and 
administrative requirements can have a positive impact for producers, especially in the absence 
of a price premium, when a high cost to benefit ratio for achieving certification makes them 
otherwise hesitant to participate. 
4.1.2 Trajectory of producer sustainability maturation in the context of certification 
Producers in the agricultural commodity sector follow a common trajectory towards 
compliance with a voluntary certification program. Participants begin by building capacity and 
seeking technical assistance from consultants, civil society groups, and researchers. In a second 
phase, producers are general participants: they make efforts to achieve certification, but not 
every action leads directly to the achievement of the sustainability goals that are the focus of the 
program overall. Only in a climax phase do participants make the advancements in sustainability 
that contributes to the additionality of a voluntary certification program (Fig 5). 
This progression from capacity building, to participation, to contributing to the program’s 
additionality is common and inherent for most commodity producers who attempt to achieve 
sustainability certification. The degree to which the progression is acknowledged explicitly 
varies depending on the voluntary certification program. Under a more straightforward program, 
such as the SAN cattle certification program, the progress by would-be participants to fulfill best 
management practices and meet standards occurs essentially in the dark. That is, the span of time 
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and activities under which producers outlay capital, build capacity, and seek technical assistance 
occurs without formal recognition. If an assessor finds that a producer’s efforts do not meet the 
requirements of the P&C, even if only for one of its production units (in the ‘participation’ phase 
of the sustainability maturation trajectory), the entire certification can be delayed. 
Under a more complex, RSPO-type certification program, the program’s coupling with 
the industry roundtable is important to its potential to attract participants. Indeed, the progression 
from member to certified company in the RSPO certification tracks the general progression of 
participants from capacity building, to participation, to contributing to the program’s 
additionality. Producer-members can interact with civil society groups in less adversarial 
settings, giving them the opportunity to learn about and strategically position themselves in 
response to known sustainability “hotspots”. Since membership in the roundtable is often 
confused with the achievement of certification, producers may use the vagueness of membership 
status to quell pressures from their critics. The mechanisms for enforcement and airing 
grievances against members and certified producers is handled directly by the RSPO, which may 
provide producers with the leniency they believe is appropriate while in the early stages prior to 
making a contribution to additionality. In recognition of the complexities of certifying a diverse 
set of operational units across multiple jurisdictions, producers are also permitted to establish a 
time-bound plan for when they will achieve full certification. Indeed, the ability for producers in 
the ‘capacity building’ and ‘participation’ phases to obtain value for their efforts at intermediate 
points in the progress towards certification depends on the shelter of general membership in the 















   
   
 








Figure 5. a) Producer maturation trajectory where an intermediate stage exists between capacity 
building (assistance) and participation in the context of achieving certification standards (RSPO-
style program) b) Producer maturation trajectory where a producer moves from capacity building 
directly to participation and contribution in the context of achieving certification standards 
(SAN-style program). 
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The RSPO certification program has the potential to attract participants by offering 
additional, non-monetary value. Multiple tactics for marketing the program may attract 
additional participants, but will also influence the kinds of participants recruited to the program 
as well as their attitudes about the purpose of the program and their role in it. For example, 
participants who use the RSPO as a total management system may lose sight of the core 
sustainability mission to reduce deforestation. Their continued buy-in for continuous 
improvement may be difficult to secure if it is divergent from their original motivation for 
joining the program. Meanwhile, because the SAN program is marketed solely as a sustainability 
standard, it may attract a more limited spectrum of potential participants, but there may be less 
confusion and a clearer vision of its purpose, with a common rationale on the part of producers 
for why they chose to participate. The differences between the SAN cattle certification program 
and RSPO certification program may reflect their core constituencies: civil society actors drive 
SAN cattle certification, while RSPO certification is considered an industry-led institution. 
4.1.3 Program credibility 
Efforts to entice producers to participate in voluntary certification programs must be 
balanced with the credibility and legitimacy of the program. The RSPO certification program 
does require all participants to ultimately reach an endpoint of full certification for all of their 
production units, but the additional compliance targets can distract from the fact that a number of 
producers are not at present able to implement all of the standards of the program. Breaking 
down the value of certification into smaller pieces and making those pieces redeemable earlier in 
the certification process is problematic for external stakeholders. Sustainability-conscious 
consumers, financial institutions, and civil society groups have argued that the pairing of the 
RSPO certification with its roundtable leads to confusion over the actual progress of producers 
working to achieve standards. For the SAN certification for cattle, producer participation is 
equivalent to certification and means full compliance with the standards required by the program. 
While the additional intermediate stage can create value to attract additional producer 
participation, the delay in full certification can lead to a delay of additionality. Delays in the 
accrual of additionality, or the perception that the standards are not able to render additionality, 
can cause the cycling of value between producers and external stakeholders to break down (Fig. 
4b). The creation of value for participating producers must be proportional to the value created 
for external stakeholders. Value for stakeholders can accrue in the form of producers fulfilling 
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what are perceived as sufficiently rigorous standards or confidence that producers are making 
meaningful strides towards meeting standards requirements. 
In the two cases, questions over the proportionality of value and the mutual interest in the 
two programs both for producers and for external stakeholders is complicated by the overall 
goals of the programs. The RSPO certification program is an offshoot of the RSPO roundtable 
(an industry organization). Accordingly, its emphasis on moving producers into the participation 
stage (Fig. 5b) is consistent with the overall organizational goal to engage stakeholders to initiate 
a dialogue about sustainability in the sector. Meanwhile, mechanisms for moving producers 
through the final “phase transition” to the contributor stage are less well developed because the 
emphasis is on producers engaging in the ongoing sustainability dialogue. The SAN certification 
programs make no distinction between the participation and contribution stages for producers 
(Fig. 5a), which means there is potentially less value to producers. 
With lower programmatic goals in terms of producer participation levels (i.e. participant 
versus contributor), the RSPO certification program is able to create additional opportunities 
within its structure and activities to generate incentives for participating producers. For example, 
with a core activity such as enforcement, the RSPO certification program has chosen an internal 
grievance process. An internal grievance system is favorable to producers, but causes 
consternation for civil society groups. If, however, program administrators decide that it is more 
beneficial in terms of influencing sustainability to reprimand rather than dismiss non-compliant 
producers (Jacobson 2013), then program administrators can strategically choose that 
enforcement does not require an independent, stricter grievance mechanism. 
While targets for participation level vary widely in the two cases according to their 
institutional history and goals (and this creates varying levels of freedom for programs to create 
producer incentives) the civil society groups who lend credibility and legitimacy to voluntary 
certification programs are broadly similar. Most civil society groups have limited allegiance to 
particular programs; they view voluntary certification standards as one tool among many for 
achieving greater sustainability in the sector. Institutional history and programmatic goals may 
be trivial to these groups compared to their own sustainability agenda. Under resource 
constraints, civil society groups may withdraw their support for the program rather than invest 
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time and resources in verifying the status of individual participants or working to fortify the 
program. 
4.2 Design opportunities 
Examination of these two voluntary certification programs reveals that there is a trade-off 
between increased participation and greater rigor. A potential remedy is to consciously consider 
how each design choice can induce a trade-off and how that trade-off can best be mitigated. For 
example, since additional opportunities to capture and redeem value can lead to increased 
participation, programs can address concerns about credibility by creating new mechanisms to 
fairly appraise these intermediate stages of producer efforts. One option is to require producers to 
adhere to more quantitative, objectively rigorous requirements at each intermediate phase in their 
progression towards certification, as a way to demonstrate a commitment to meeting standards. 
This sort of requirement might satisfy some civil society groups who could benefit from more 
granular data about producer commitments to sustainability. Some authors, however, have 
criticized the emphasis on what they refer to as output legitimacy of voluntary certification 
programs in terms of them meeting pre-determined outcomes, arguing that an emphasis on 
outcomes depoliticizes the decisions about what those outcomes ought to be (Elgert 2012). 
Another possibility for the complex, RSPO-type certification programs is to focus on input 
legitimacy by securing more inclusiveness in the power structure of the program (Elgert 2012). 
For example, producers still may be granted voting rights upon membership to the roundtable, 
but the RSPO could also award voting rights to representatives of local and indigenous groups 
who reside in areas of palm oil production. 
5. Conclusion   
Both programs struggle to move producers from the engaged, interested, or general 
participant phase, to one in which they are contributing to sustainability in the sector and the 
additionality of the program. The RSPO certification program provides participants with 
opportunities to participate at earlier points in the certification process and rewards efforts that 
other programs, such as the SAN cattle certification program, may regard as ancillary to 
certification. These intermediate rewards are potential enticements to engage in the program 
more fully as contributors to additionality. The challenge in the RSPO certification program is 
that there are no consistent benchmarks for participant progress towards compliance as a 
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function of where they are in the certification process. In addition, the larger producers seeking 
certification are so complex that their individual paths to certification are unique. More 
specificity about what is required of participants at these intermediate horizons (e.g. membership 
in the roundtable, or time-bound plans) may decrease the ambiguity that currently prevails about 
the efforts of participants. Civil society groups might benefit from reduced costs of investigating 
a producer’s commitments to certification. The SAN cattle certification has no intermediate 
opportunities along the route to full certification; it combines the participation and contributor 
(full certification) stages into one. Participants are not certified until they have met all of the 
requirements of the standard for the entirety of their operation. But this does not mean that the 
phase transition from capacity building to a higher stage of participation occurs more readily 
within the program; potential participants to the program may be deterred by the delayed payoff 
for their efforts. Within a value-creation framework for understanding the design choices and 
implementation strategies of voluntary certification programs, the challenge of achieving that 
final phase transition to contribution is one of external stakeholders asking for more value 
without having a sufficient amount of non-monetary value to trade back to producers. As such, 
the cycle of value breaks down. 
More conscious planning of the development of certification programs over time is an 
underutilized design strategy that could mitigate limitations that arise due to a lack of resources 
and the inherent tensions about striking a balance between scale and rigor. Introducing a set of 
well-defined expectations about what participants must accomplish at particular milestones may 
help to reconcile the interests of the program as it interacts with both participants and civil 
society groups. Producers can use intermediate points of verification to satisfy NGOs about their 
progress towards sustainability, introduce their products to additional markets, and justify the 
costs of certification. NGOs can benefit from the ability to assess additionality more granularly 
and more frequently as part of their efforts to benchmark sustainability progress. Such strategic 
sequencing could soften the current dilemma faced by most certification programs about the pros 
and cons of strict enforcement versus wider participation. 
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